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Historically, Scotland has struggled against internal 
turmoil as well as having struggled to maintain its 
autonomy. The Union of 1707 was a political movement which 
brought economic prosperity to the elites and economic 
devastation to the working class of Scotland. Consequently, 
without political support from the larger parties in 
Scotland, devolutionists were unable to establish any form 
of local government other than the Scottish Office. 
Attempts were made by home rule advocates to organize 
formally, but none were as successful as the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). As economic conditions declined, and 
oil was found in the North Sea, the SNP gained some 
credibility and threatened the position of the most powerful 
party in Scotland, the Labour Party. The Labour Party 
realized that it must deter the SNP's growing popularity by 
working for devolution. 
Economics and nationalism were significant factors in 
raising Scottish political consciousness, but were unable to 
bring about successful devolution. Problems within pro-
devolution parties as well as between these parties held 
back the devolution plan drafting process. 
The passage of the Scottish Devolution Referendum in 1997 
was due to the efforts of the Labour Party under the 
leadership of Tony Blair. Blair recognized the domestic and 
political advantages of Scotland having its own parliament. 
As a result, he used devolution as one of his key party 
issues on his 1997 platforms. Blair quelled the 
fractionalization of the Labour Party which had been a 
primary reason for devolution referendum failure in 1979. 
He harnessed Scotland's economic discontent and rising 
nationalism to draft successfully and pass the 1997 
devolution referendum. 
Director: Prof. Forest Grieves 
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PREFACE 
During my junior year abroad in Scotland, I became 
aware of the differences in Scottish culture compared to 
that of British culture so heavily influenced by England. 
Like most Americans, I was completely ignorant of the 
differences between two distinct cultures, the Anglo-Norman 
English and the Celtic Scots, existing on one island and of 
the tension existing between them. 
The Scots were dissatisfied with their representation 
in the British Parliament, as well as with the gradual 
stripping of their identity from them for the past two 
hundred and ninety years by the English. My friends from 
both sides of the border were more than willing to discuss 
the political, social, and economic tensions between England 
and Scotland. It was during this time that one friend 
declared that Scotland was going to have its own parliament 
before the beginning of the next decade. The first thought 
that came to mind was, "Is Nicola a Scottish Nationalist?" 
No, she was not a nationalist, for she did not want to cut 
all ties with England. Nic, like the majority of the 
V 
Scottish population, believed that Scotland should have more 
control over Scotland's affairs, and it was only a matter of 
time before devolution became a reality. 
The right time and political arena for devolution was 
in 1997 when the Labour Party won the election. Having 
firmly committed themselves to devolution when they brought 
it to the forefront of its campaign platform. Labour wasted 
no time in producing a devolution plan. The plan was met 
with approval by the majority of the Labour Party and the 
Liberal Party, as well as a considerable portion of the 
Scottish Nationalist Party. The result of these efforts was 
the successful passage of the Scottish Devolution referendum 
on September 12, 1997, and a topic for my thesis. 
Devolution is a complex development influenced by 
economics and nationalism. However, until the political 
mechanisms, meaning dominant political parties and political 
elites, harness these two components, devolution cannot 
occur. More specifically, without the efforts of the Labour 
Party, the devolution referendum would not have passed in 
1997. 
vi 
GLOSSARY 
The Act of Union (1707). The disintegration of the 
Scottish Parliament and the joining of Scotland with 
England to create the Parliament of Great Britain. 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA). Devolutionists 
formed this group specifically to create a directly 
elected legislative assembly for Scotland. 
The Celts. The people originally populating Scotland. 
These people were barbarians who had their 
own distinct language, culture, and religion. 
Conservative Party. The political party most 
consistently opposed to devolution and all it entails. 
The Conservative party is the party located on the 
right side of the political party spectrum. 
Devolution. The transfer of specific powers of the 
central government to directly elected subordinate 
bodies. 
European Union An organization that European countries 
join in order to work towards economic stability and 
trade advantages. 
Gaelic. Language spoken by the Celts in Scotland and in 
Ireland. 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). The radical division of 
Irish nationalists who use violence in their fight for 
the unification of Northern Ireland and Ireland. 
The Jacobites. Scots who fought for the return of the 
Royal Stuarts to the Scottish and English throne. 
Though mostly Highlanders, this group also included 
Catholics and Scottish Lowlanders who remained loyal to 
"Bonnie Prince Charlie" (Charles Stuart). 
Scottish Labour Party. The political party in Scotland 
responsible for the occurrence of devolution. Its 
counterpart in England is the British Labour Party 
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which gave the Scottish Labour the support and 
leadership necessary for devolution to occur. 
Scottish dialect. The accent, rhythm, and pronunciation of 
words in the English language, as well as slang and 
word use of the Scots. It is distinctly different than 
the dialect spoken by the English, being softer, with 
the words slurred together. 
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). The political party who 
has working diligently towards separation from the 
United Kingdom. Some of its members favor devolution 
because it is popular with the majority of Scots and 
can be more easily realized than separation. 
The Scottish Office. A form of ruling body created in the 
1920's which is granted limited power to resolve 
domestic political, economic, and social issues in 
Scotland. 
Sein Fenn. The organization of Irish nationalists who 
peacefully work towards resolving tension and violence 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
CHAPTER I 
DEVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND: AN INTRODUCTION 
Devolution is defined as the transfer of specific 
powers of the central government to directly elected 
subordinate bodies. Not to be confused with federalism, 
devolution is the process by which the central government 
transfers some specific powers without relinquishing its 
supremacy.^ Devolution, therefore, allows local governments 
to have more control over their domestic affairs. Theorists 
contend that devolution is a natural result of social 
tension, economic change, and political evolution. Whether 
devolution has been occurring as a result of political 
manipulation of nationalism or economics, or to preserve 
unitary governments, it has been occurring all over the 
world. The revival of nationalism and economic development 
in countries has caused political upheaval, and devolution 
is the solution to instability and decline.^ 
The focus of this thesis is the Labour Party's key role 
in the success of devolution in Scotland through examining 
1 
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Scotland's 290 year struggle for its own parliament.^ The 
historical role of Scotland's economic instability and 
nationalism was significant in bringing about devolution in 
Scotland. However, politics played the key role in the 
transition, utilizing the economic and nationalist movements 
to achieve devolution. Without the cohesion of the Labour 
Party and its leadership, the vote for devolution would not 
have passed. 
A comparison between the economic and social conditions 
of 1979 and 1997 illustrates that there is very little 
difference between them. In both 1979 and 1997 there was 
high unemployment, a lack of attention paid to Scotland's 
domestic affairs, and a very strong nationalist movement in 
existence. The difference between 1979 and 1997 is the 
organization and cohesiveness of the Labour Party. Through 
Tony Blair's leadership, the organization and focus of the 
Labour Party changed. Realigning the intent and purpose of 
the Party by focusing on issues which would lead to an 
electoral victory compelled Labour to take devolution 
seriously.^ 
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The 1979 Labour Party was split over devolution. 
Internal factions existing within factions made it difficult 
for party leadership to formulate a reasonable plan for 
devolution. In addition to internal factionalization. 
Labour's poor relationship with the Liberal Party and 
intense competition with the Scottish Nationalist Party made 
agreeing upon a devolution plan an almost impossible task. 
However, Blair's efforts to change the Labour Party to 
insure electoral success, as well as better to meet the 
domestic needs of the Scots, were the impetus for 
devolution.^ 
Devolution was an inevitable political movement in 
Scotland. It was essential for the effective resolution of 
domestic affairs, as well as a strategic move for the Labour 
Party. Devolution has occurred in Scotland, but it is not 
alone in political evolution. Countries in Western and 
Eastern Europe, North i\merica, Asia, and South America are 
all devolving for the same reasons as Scotland, as well as 
for other reasons®. 
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Devolution Worldwide 
Devolution is occurring worldwide for the same reasons 
it is transpiring in Scotland: political groups harnessing 
economic and nationalist movements to establish their own 
ruling body. Theorists argue that Scotland needs to have 
its own ruling body to resolve successfully its economic 
problems. However, another reason which is not central to 
this thesis, but nonetheless used as a counter argument for 
separatism's association with devolution, is that it is 
necessary to preserve the state. These theorists posit that 
devolution is essential for the preservation of the United 
Kingdom, and it has also become essential in preventing the 
disintegration of governments in other countries.^ 
Countries which have devolved governments include 
Spain, former countries of the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, 
Canada, New Zealand, Italy, and Mexico.® These countries 
have faced the reality that they must devolve in order to 
resolve issues of nationalism, economic development, and 
political differences. In countries such as Scotland, there 
have been protests, strikes, and rallies in which Scots have 
protested against the ineffectiveness of the British 
Parliament and to show their support for devolution.® 
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However, in other countries, such as the ones in the former 
Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Spain, and Italy, devolution has 
not only become necessary for unity, but also to stop 
violent acts of war from occurring or continuing.^" 
Sri Lanka's colonial legacy has left it with a highly 
centralized political and administrative system. This 
strong tradition of a powerful centralized government has 
caused political discord among the three different ethnic 
sects in the country. Their religious and social 
differences, as well as economic jealousies, have created 
problems among these groups for hundreds of years. 
The Sinhala Maha Sabha, the Tamil Congress, and the 
Musliui League have been violently feuding for a great period 
of time. The Sinhalese, the largest ethnic group in Sri 
Lanka, have the majority of power. They are unwilling to 
extend any of the considerable power they enjoy at the 
national level to people outside of their immediate circle. 
The Sinhalese ignore the Tamil's political and cultural 
demands. They refuse to work out language differences, to 
work on land development, or to address the needs for 
regions or districts brought to the attention of the Prime 
ministers by local authorities.^^ 
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Until recently, the Unitarian Sinhalese government has 
also refused to devolve adequate powers from the center to 
regions inhabited by the Tamils. Violent acts and Tamils' 
threats of separation from Sri Lanka have forced the 
Sinhalese to acknowledge the need for devolved power. The 
purpose of devolution is to ease Tamil alienation and keep 
intact a single nation through transferring power to local 
governments. Yet, at this point in the devolution process, 
several plans for power distribution have been rejected. 
Suggestions have included allowing the Ceylon Tamils more 
involvement in the economy, politics, and infrastructure of 
their society. As this transformation occurs, Sri Lanka 
will not only be preserving its central governm.ent, but it 
will also prosper. 
While Sri Lanka's need for devolution is based on 
nationalism, the devolution occurring in the former Soviet 
Union is based on both nationalism and economics, but with 
more emphasis placed on economics than nationalism. 
Countries such as Chechnya and Tatarstan have experienced 
devastating violence because of ethnic and economic 
inequality. The resolution of this devastating violence is 
devolution. 
7 
Avoiding the emotionally charged rhetoric of self-
determination and of Tatarstan's nationalist and historical 
claims to sovereignty, their leaders have instead used their 
vast oil resources and their industrial base as levers to 
secure political and economic concessions from Moscow. 
Consequently, wealthy republics secure greater rights and 
privileges than their poorer neighbors, and these greater 
rights and privileges may destabilize the federation. 
However, the very concept of devolving power and allowing 
its republics more authority over its domestic affairs is a 
step in the right direction if peace and unity are to be 
maintained. Devolution of power is one of the best tools at 
the central government's disposal to preserve its 
territorial integrity and ensure political stability in the 
medium and the long term.^^ 
Scotland's Historical, Nationalist and Economic Claim for 
Devolved Power 
The concept of devolved power has existed in Scotland 
since its aristocrats and rich elites gave Scotland to 
England to form the United Kingdom. Devolved power is not 
complete separation from the United Kingdom. Devolving 
power would allow Scotland to be an equal to England's 
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status in the United Kingdom rather than continue its 
current status as a the weaker member in the United Kingdom. 
Though initially promised a partnership rather than a 
province-within-a-state relationship, Scotland soon found 
itself subservient to England. As a result, the Scots first 
voiced weakly their need for more power over their own 
domestic affairs. As their confidence in their right to 
their own ruling body became stronger, Scotland's political, 
economic, and national voices became stronger. 
The Scots united with England in 1707, giving up their 
right to full control over their domestic affairs in 
exchange for an equal economic and political partnership in 
the United Kingdom. Even with the unequal power 
relationship, they managed to retain a separate and distinct 
identity from the English. Their speech, mannerisms, 
religion, literature, and culture differ significantly from 
the English. This retention of tradition and culture has 
long been a source of conflict between the two nations, with 
the English wanting the Scots to conform to their cultural 
identity. 
The Scots have resisted, keeping their own education 
system. Their education system has long been considered by 
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other European countries to be superior to that of the 
English system, having educated numerous famous writers, 
theorists, scientists, and inventors. The Scots have also 
been able to maintain their own legal system, as well as a 
separate religion." Nationalism has played a distinctive 
role in keeping the concept of devolution alive until it 
became a reality in September 1997. However, nationalism 
was not the deciding factor, nor was it the only factor. 
Economics has played a key role in the campaign for 
devolution. In the beginning of the Union, the aristocrats 
and the Scottish elites were aware of the economic 
advantages they would gain from the unification of Scotland 
with England. A union would bring Scotland a share in the 
British East India Company, the English Colonies, the 
English System of Navigation Acts and mercantilism. These 
advantages were truly such for those Scots who were already 
affluent and had the money to invest in these endeavors. 
However, the average Scot, who was most likely a farmer 
eking out a living from the land, did not benefit from these 
advantages. 
Industrialization of Scotland brought greater 
prosperity to more Scots, lasting until the mid-1950's when 
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Scotland experienced economic distress. Between 1954 and 
1967, 90, 000 Scots lost their jobs because the old, heavy-
industry of the previous and earlier part of the century had 
declined. Employment, which had once been found in 
shipbuilding, coal mining, and railways, was no longer to be 
found.'' 
As Scotland headed into the next decade, the Scots were 
no longer willing to experience passively a greater decline 
in their economic state. Consequently, when oil was 
discovered in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland, the 
Scots immediately claimed it as theirs, and resented sharing 
any of the income accrued from it with England. Yet, even 
the rush of econom.ic vitality was singularly incapable of 
bringing about devolution. 
Nationalism and economics alone were not enough to 
bring about devolution. Yet, when combined and manipulated 
by politics, these two movements played a significant role 
in devolution. Consequently, the political machine in 
Scotland brought about devolution just as it brought about 
the Union of 1707. The Union of 1707 was a political move 
based on the desires of the Scottish elites and aristocrats. 
This decision would have a significant impact on the socio­
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economic conditions in Scotland, benefiting the affluent 
rather than the masses. The British Parliament soon 
recognized these poor conditions and reacted by establishing 
the Scottish Office in 1885 to handle the domestic affairs 
of Scotland." 
The Scottish Office received the minimum amount of 
authority the British Parliament believed was necessary to 
meet the needs of the Scots. However, as social and 
economic problems changed or increased, the British 
Parliament was compelled to give it more power to resolve 
these problems. The Scottish Office used the increased 
pov/er to the best of its ability, but their efforts were 
often fruitless, such as the tim.e period between 1954-1967, 
when over 90,000 Scots lost their jobs. The compilation of 
bad housing, high unemployment, and low wages compelled the 
Scots to act instead of remaining passive. The action taken 
was a revival of nationalism by the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) 
This radical nationalist group called for the complete 
separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, basing their 
party platform on Scotland's weakened economic, social, and 
political conditions.The Scottish National Party, which 
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before this time had very little credibility, began to win 
seats in the Parliament. The Scottish Labour Party, which 
had been the strongest party representing Scotland in the 
British Parliament, felt threatened by the Scottish 
Nationalists, and were compelled by Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson's government to take up the fight for devolution.^® 
Home rule has consistently constituted the social and 
political thought of the Labour Party. However, during the 
1970s, a combination of factions within the party and poor 
relationships with other parties supporting the devolution 
deterred the development of a feasible devolution plan.^^ 
The Scottish National Party, the Scottish Liberals, and 
the Scottish Labour Party, while all wanting some form of 
autonomy for Scotland, did not have the same immediate goals 
in mind. The Scottish Nationalists were not content with 
the mere state of devolved power, but wanted complete 
separation from England. They believed their argument was 
credible because the North Sea oil would make their economy 
a viable one.^® 
The Liberals were in favor of devolution, but disagreed 
with the Labour Party's devolution plan. The parties 
refused to work together to form a cohesive and satisfactory 
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plan which all of the parties would support. Essentially, 
it was the lack of organization and ability to work together 
which constituted the failure of the devolution referendum 
in 1979. However, there were other reasons for the failure, 
such as determining who was part of the electorate in 
Scotland, and a single question rather than a multiple 
question referendum which led to resentment as well as a 
split in voting. Many Labour and Liberal Party supporters 
did not vote for devolution because the proposal was not 
radical enough, it did not include the type of change they 
expected in the referendum, or it did not promise enough 
autonomy for Scotland. As a result, the referendum 
failed. 
There were also several fears and some confusion 
attached to devolution that prevented people from voting for 
it or caused them to abstain from the vote. The fear of 
complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, 
which many people believed would be inevitable if Scotland 
were to have home rule, the fear of regionalism, and the 
fear of the disintegration of the United Kingdom were ones 
which caused the referendum to fail. These fears are not 
without basis, considering complete separation of Scotland 
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from the United Kingdom was exactly what the Scottish 
National Party advocated^". 
However, when considering the oil crises in the 1970's, 
as well as Scotland's dependency in areas such as foreign 
affairs, the military, and finance for Scotland's 
infrastructure, the actual occurrence of separation was not 
a plausible threat. These fears were not addressed by the 
1979 referendum, and the lack of cooperation between the 
parties exacerbated these fears rather than alleviating 
them. 
Yet, these fears and the failure of the referendum did 
not stop the Labour Party from retaining devolution on their 
platform, the Scottish Nationalists from, working towards 
separation, or the Liberal Party from advocating devolved 
power. Retention of devolution on these parties' platforms 
has several explanations. The Labour Party, whose division 
over devolution was reflected in the lack of consensus in 
the referendum vote, committed itself to a stronger form of 
devolution than the Scotland Act had contained. However, 
when the Labour Party lost power after the devolution 
referendum, devolution became less of a priority while 
addressing issues more pressing and more likely to win 
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elections became the focal point. The Liberal Party and 
the newly formed Social Democratic Party remained focused on 
devolution, but the failure of the Scotland Act in 1979 had 
shaken their confidence. Consequently, their attentions 
shifted to other pressing matters.^'' 
Devolution was not dead. In fact, after years under a 
Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher, another 
revival of Scottish nationalism was inevitable. Thatcher's 
Conservative government was not interested in resolving 
Scotland's socio-economic problems. Her government made 
decisions which had adverse affects on Scotland. As a 
result, the Scots felt slighted, as though they had only a 
token voice in the British Parliament. Consequently, with 
the economic strain, lack of control over their domestic 
affairs, and a renewed sense of national identity, the 
political parties in Scotland saw their chance to bring a 
new, improved and cohesive plan for devolution back to the 
Scottish people. 
Acknowledging the lack of unity among the parties in 
favor of some form of devolution, the Constitutional 
Convention was formed. The Labour Party, the Liberal Party, 
the Scottish National Party, and the Social Democratic Party 
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were all a part of this effort. Their combined efforts were 
essential in order to develop a devolution referendum that 
considered and resolved previously existing problems. 
Support for the Constitutional Convention increased as the 
popularity of the Conservative Party, led by Margaret 
Thatcher and then John Major, steadily declined. In 1995, 
Tony Blair saw devolution as a key component of the Labour 
Party's platform for the next election. Blair, as the 
leader of the Labour Party, made devolution a national issue 
rather than merely a Scottish one. With Blair's full 
support of devolution for both Scotland and Wales, the 
Constitutional Convention gained credibility and increased 
SUi~mTl^+' -r — 
It is undeniable that the socio-economic conditions 
were prime for devolution and played a significant role. 
However, without the Labour Party's use of devolution as a 
part of its campaign platform, it is unlikely the referendum 
would have passed. Therefore, it is the thesis of this 
study that the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum passed 
because of the endorsement of the Labour Party and the 
cohesion and agreement among the parties. 
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Devolution was necessary to give Scotland the authority 
it needed to resolve domestic problems. Chapter One asserts 
that devolution was a result of Scotland's economic and 
nationalistic need manipulated by a political machine (the 
Labour Party) to achieve devolution. Chapter Two is an 
historical analysis of Scotland's struggle for autonomy, 
illustrating how nationalism and economics were the tools 
the political machines manipulated throughout Scotland's 
history. Whether the decisions were made by the masses or 
by the elites, devolution and union were a political 
decision. Chapter Three analyzes the roles of economics and 
nationalism. It illustrates how extreme displays of 
nationalism, industry's support of devolution, and economic 
distress or prosperity alone were not enough to bring about 
devolution.^® Chapter Four examines the role the Labour 
Party played in organizing the devolution movement. Changes 
in party focus were necessary to make devolution a reality 
as well as to give Labour an electoral victory. Chapter 
Five concludes the study with an analysis offered by the 
author from the evidence presented in the previous four 
chapters. 
18 
NOTES 
'Vernon Bogdanor, "Devolving for a Stronger Union," 
Comparative Politics (Connecticut: Dushkin, McGraw, Hill, 
1998) , 38 . 
^Jack Brand, "Political Parties and the Referendum on 
National Sovereignty: The 1979 Scottish Referendum on 
Devolution," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13 
(1986): 31. 
^Maureen Johnson, "Scots Parliament Signals Changes, 
Excites Nationalism," Missoulian (Missoula), September 13, 
1997, A-9. 
^Patrick Seyd, New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the 
Polls (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 
Inc.,1997), 90. 
®Ibid., 51. 
®Bruce Matthews, "Devolution of Power in Sri Lanka," 
The Round Table 33 0 (April 1, 1994): 230. 
^J.H. Proctor, "Lessons from the Scottish Referendum on 
Devolution," Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary 
Studies 1641-2 (1982): 1. 
®The Scottish Office, Lessons to be Learned from Munich 
Meetings on Devolution (October 3, 1997), 1. 
^Alexander McLeod, "Scots of Many Stripes Urge a 
Separate Parliament," Christian Science Monitor , 11 
September 1997, 6. 
^°Ibid., 231; idem, "Devolution of Power in Sri Lanka," 
The Round Table. 
^'Ibid., 232. 
"ibid., 233. 
19 
''Ibid., 239. 
'•^Laurence S. Hanauer, "Tatarstan's Bid for Autonomy: 
Tatarstan as a Model for the Devolution of Power in the 
Russian Federation," Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics 12 (March 1, 1996): 63. 
"Ibid., 65. 
James Kellas, The Scottish Political System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 130. 
'"'Donald Dewar, "Scottish Parliament," Survey of 
Current Affairs (August 1997): 292-295. 
'®Phillip Norton, The Constitution in Flux (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1982), 175. 
'®Louis L. Snyder, Global Mini-Nationalism: Autonomy 
or Independence (West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1982) , 28 . 
^°Ibid., 29. 
^'Neil MacCormick, et al., The Scottish Debate: Essays 
on Scottish Nationalism (Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 
1970), 65. 
^^Philip Norton, The British Polity (London: Longman 
Group, Ltd., 1984), 227. 
"Ibid., 228. 
^''ibid., 65; idem. The Scottish Debate: Essays on 
Scottish Nationalism. 
^^L.J. Sharpe, "Devolution and Celtic Nationalism in 
the UK," West European Politics 8 (1985): 87. 
^^Jack Geekie and Roger Levy, "Devolution and the 
Tartanisation of the Labour Party," Parliamentary Affairs 
42 (July 1989): 400. 
20 
Mitchell, "From Unitary State to Union State: 
Labour's Changing View of the United Kingdom and its 
Implication," Regional Studies 30 (October 1996) : 608. 
^®Ibid., 1642; idem, "Lessons from the Scottish 
Referendum on Devolution," Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies. 
"ibid., 1642. 
^"Alexander MacCleod, "Scots of Many Stripes Urge a 
Separate Parliament," Christian Science Monitor , 11 
September 1997. 
^^Ibid., 88; idem, "Devolution and Celtic Nationalism 
in the UK," West European Politics. 
^^James Kellas, The Scottish Political System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 159. 
"Ibid., 160. 
^^Ibid., 161. 
^®C. Railings, et al. , British Elections and Parties 
Yearbook 1995. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996), 91. 
^®Willie Thompson, "One Party, Two Visions," New 
Statesmen. 7 March 1997, 16-17. 
"Ibid., 17. 
^®Patrick Dunleavy and others, ed., Developments in 
British Politics (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997). 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Though Scotland is composed of people descending from 
various different cultures, such as the Scandinavians, the 
French, and others, it was originally populated by the 
Picts, and then later by the Scots who came from Ireland. 
These two groups of people, known as Celts, had their own 
distinct language, their own culture, and physical 
characteristics which made them far different than the 
Romans, and later the Anglo-Normans, who attempted to invade 
them throughout the centuries.* 
Through different phases in history, the Celts were 
both feared for their savagery and manipulated easily due to 
their indigenous state. Their savagery and innocence were 
mainly due to the violent struggle among the clans for 
control. Failed attempts at unification have repeatedly led 
Scotland into a state of vulnerability from first the 
Romans, and later the English. Throughout the centuries, 
the Celts have fought against each other for control over 
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land, and fought against outside forces to maintain their 
sovereignty.^ 
Historical Events Preceding The Act Of Union 
The Celtic people of Scotland and Ireland are believed 
to have migrated from northern Italy to the British Isles 
sometime before 80 BC. While there is no documentation of 
the existence of the Celts before this date, there are a 
number of written descriptions from the Romans about them. 
The Roman's first documented encounter with the Celts was in 
80 AD when Julius Agricola attempted to cross the River 
Clyde and was deterred by bands of warring Celts.^ 
The threat of Roman invasion forced the Celts to 
refrain from fighting each other and to unite against the 
Romans. So, in 84 AD, the Celts' first attempt at 
unification was under Calgacus to fight against the Romans. 
Calgacus, along with 10,000 Celts were killed when they met 
the Roman army at Ardoch. However, their lives were not 
given in vain as their efforts forced the Romans from 
Scotland. Their defeat, combined with the violence and lack 
of humane behavior exhibited by the Celts during battle, 
instilled fear in the Romans.'' 
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Diodorus Siculus, a Roman historian described the Celts 
... terrifying... They are very tall in stature, 
with rippling muscles under clear white skin. Their 
hair is blond, but not naturally so: they bleach it, to 
this day, artificially, washing it in lime and combing 
it back from their foreheads. They look like wood-
demons, their hair thick and shaggy like a horse's 
mane. Some of them are clean-shaven, but others-
especially those of high rank, shave their cheeks but 
leave a moustache that covers the whole mouth and, 
when they eat and drink, acts like a sieve, trapping 
particles of food...The way they dress is astonishing: 
they wear brightly colored and embroidered shirts, with 
trousers called bracae and cloaks fastened at the 
shoulder with a brooch, heavy in winter, light in 
summer. These cloaks are striped or checkered in 
design, with the separate checks close together and in 
various colors.^ 
He also describes their battle dress, which includes bronze 
helmets with figures picked out on them, even horns, which 
made them look even taller than they physically were. 
Others covered themselves with breast-armor made out of 
chains, while others fought naked. Before entering battle, 
the Celts used intimidation tactics such as playing weird, 
discordant horns to create frightening noises in conjunction 
with their shouting in loud, harsh voices and beating their 
swords rhythmically against their shields.® 
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The Romans wore armor, carried shields, and cropped 
their hair, but these were civilized and accepted manners in 
warfare. They saw the differences in the Celtic culture and 
tried to conquer them because of these differences. 
Differences in religion, language, and the legal and 
authoritative systems which compelled the Celts to paint 
their faces, dye their hair, act like animals, and commit 
savage acts were beyond the understanding of the Romans.^ 
The Romans soon learned to be frightened of these 
noises, because the Celts not only sounded violent and 
demented, they acted violent and demented. The Celts cut 
off their enemies' heads and nailed them over the doors of 
their huts in the manner a hunter would do with the skulls 
of the animal he has slain. The unpredictable and 
frightening behavior of the Celts compelled the Romans to 
protect their empire rather than attempt to expand it into 
Scotland.® 
This fear of the Celts compelled the Emperor Hadrian to 
build a wall in 120 AD which was intended to keep the Celts 
out of the empire. Extending from the Irish Sea to the 
North Sea, Hadrian's Wall measured approximately ten feet 
high, and as much as five feet thick in some parts. For a 
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time, the wall discouraged the Celts' attacks on the Romans. 
Though an estimable deterrent, the wall failed to stop the 
fierce Celts and Anglos from joining together and attacking 
the Romans in London in 368 AD. They were not successful, 
but the fact that they traveled to London to attack the 
Romans was enough to instill fear of the Celts in the 
Romans. Consequently, fear was the basis for Rome's 
decision to leave the Celts to their own culture and 
language.® 
The Celts no longer had the Romans to contend with, but 
they still had each other. Renewed internal power struggles 
over land, and the need for control of the different tribes 
within Scotland contributed to the disunited turmoil of the 
Celts. Even with the advent of St. Columba, who 
christianized the Celts, the clans continued bitterly to 
dislike each other. 
Finally, in 843 AD, Kenneth MacAlpin united the two 
Celtic tribes, the Scots from Ireland and the Picts of 
Scotland. The unification process MacAlpin started was not 
completed until at least 1034 AD and perhaps much later. 
This unification process was not a peaceful one, with family 
members killing each other, such as Malcolm II killing 
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Kenneth III and becoming king in 1005. Duncan of 
Strathclyde killed his grandfather (Malcolm II) in 1034 to 
become king. MacBeth, in 1040, killed Duncan and became 
King, and Malcolm Canmore killed MacBeth in 1057 AD to 
become king. With fratricide prevalent in the ruling class 
of Scotland, there is little wonder that clans were 
continually at odds with one another. 
England's Domination of Scotland 
Yet, even with the existence of ruling-class violence, 
Scotland continued to remain united under the changing 
rulers and remained free of English rule. However, upon the 
death of Edgar in 1107, Scotland's unity was seriously 
threatened. Scotland was split into regions and ruled by two 
different kings. Alexander I became the King of Scots, but 
David I became King of Lothian and Strathclyde. Tenuous 
unity was restored upon Alexander I's death in 1124 AD. At 
this time, David became king of the Scots, and his- reign was 
one of the most important in Scotland's history. His 
borders extended beyond Scottish borders to the River Tees 
and Northumberland in England. Scotland was a powerful 
force to be reckoned with, but it was soon to be conquered 
by the English. 
Scotland's unity was destroyed by England's annexation 
of Scotland in 1296. Clan conflicts and internal betrayal 
led to King Edward I's vanquishing the Scots. Scottish 
lairds were seduced by King Edward I's promises of lands and 
riches if they submitted to English rule. Edward's rule, 
though at times unfair to the lairds, was cruel and unjust 
to the peasants and middle-class Scots. High taxes and 
Edward's desire to remove Scottishness from the Scots worked 
to destroy Scotland's social and economic structure. A lack 
of identity, economic depression, and political helplessness 
almost destroyed Scotland. Embarrassing incidents, such as 
England's capture of its Coronation Stone, also added to the 
deterioration of their identity. 
Known by the Scots as the "The Stone of Destiny" or 
"The Stone of Scone," the Coronation Stone was used for 
crowning Scotland's rulers. Stealing the Scots' Coronation 
Stone was another illustration of England's domination of 
Scotland. It was placed in Westminster Abbey as a slight to 
the Scots and as a show of dominion over them. Yet, even 
with this slight, the Scottish lairds did nothing to defend 
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Scotland against England. Scottish rebels, such as William 
Wallace, managed to inspire the Scottish masses to rebel 
against the English. 
Wallace pushed the English out of Scotland, even going 
as far as to threaten military strong-holds in England. 
However, though Wallace had the support of the Scottish 
masses, he was betrayed by the Scottish lairds. Upon his 
capture, Wallace was tortured, hanged, and drawn and 
quartered. Wallace became a martyr, and his cause was taken 
up by Robert the Bruce, a laird who had sided with the 
English before Wallace's death. 
Once again unified under Robert the Bruce, the Celts 
routed the English in 1314 at Bannockburn. Scotland was 
recognized as being independent by both the Church and 
England. The marriage of James (Stuart)VI of Scotland to 
King Henry VII's daughter in 1502 was significant because it 
decreased the level of violence on both sides of the border. 
Eliminating the violence and joining the aristocracy of 
Scotland and England paved the way for the Union of Crowns 
in 1603, as well as setting the stage for the Act of Union 
in 1707." 
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Act of Union in 1707 
The joining of the Crowns was the first step towards 
Union. Other catalysts of the eventual union of Scotland 
and England were the differences in religion due to the 
Reformation in the mid-lSOO's as well as the economic 
condition of Scotland. Scotland's long history of internal 
turmoil was typified by the differences between the Highland 
Scots and the Lowland Scots. Internal turmoil did not 
lessen as time passed. The Reformation did nothing to 
alleviate the clash between them because the Lowland Scots 
quickly, and with very little resistance, converted to 
Presbyterianism while the Highlanders remained Catholic. 
Converting to Protestantism at first appeared to have 
resolved the religious differences between the English and 
the Scots, but later proved to be a false hope. 
In 1688, William of Orange asked the English Parliament 
to oust the current King James VI of Scotland (also known as 
James II of England). William pushed for displacing James 
II because James II's own rule stated that "...attending a 
Covenanting (a secret meeting of Scottish Presbyterians) was 
a n  a c t  o f  w o r s h i p  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  c a p i t a l  c r i m e . M a n y  
Scottish Presbyterians paid the penalty for this crime, and 
James II succeeded in alienating all people upon whom he 
relied for support. He was forced from the thrones of 
England and Scotland in 1688, ending the rule of the Stuart 
Kings." 
James II accepted his exile peacefully, but many of his 
followers did not, resulting in terrible battles between the 
Scottish Protestants and English Protestants. Fighting also 
occurred between these two sects of Protestants and the 
Scottish Catholics, who still had strong ties with Catholic 
France. One side perceived William of Orange as the valiant 
champion of Presbyterians against the Scottish Catholics. 
However, this view is not commonly accepted by historians 
because of conflicting evidence that William of Orange was 
on friendly terms with the Pope and had many Catholics 
fighting in his army. The motivation behind William of 
Orange's action was purely a political maneuver against 
James II. 
The religious wars eventually came to a halt, with the 
Highland Scots being forced to swear their loyalty to the 
anti-Catholic, anti-Stuart, anti-Scots, anti-Highlander, and 
anti-French English King from Holland. King William of 
Orange dealt with the Scots, but the betrayal and 
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humiliation suffered by many Scots at his hands would plant 
slowly growing seeds for the Jacobite Rebellion, which was 
an uprising between Stuart royalists and Scots and English 
loyal to the monarchs of England, in the 1700's.^^ 
Other key factors for unification were the role 
economics and the possible military threat from the English. 
Scotland's economy was primarily agricultural, with little 
industry to bring prosperity to those who already were 
fairly affluent. Industrialization would increase the 
profits of the affluent from the efforts of the lower 
classes, persuading the upper class to embrace the union. 
The other factor was the constant military threat from the 
English. The English, who were constantly at odds with the 
French, feared the alliance still existing between France 
and Scotland. As a result, the English amassed a strong 
military force at its northern borders in the event the 
Scots, with their French allies, would attempt an invasion. 
Therefore, political and economic elites in the Lowlands saw 
the advantages a Union would offer. A union between the 
Crowns had existed successfully for years, and they presumed 
that it would not be very difficult to persuade the Scots to 
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sacrifice their sovereignty for the advantages a union would 
offer.'® 
Eighteenth Century Scotland 
At first, the Union appeared to be accepted by the 
Scots. With Scots placed in the position of resolving 
Scotland's local problems, it seemed that the Scots were 
satisfied. However, clan rivalry and old feuds often were 
at the root of unfair actions taken by empowered Scots. As 
a result, corruption and abuse of the system were common 
occurrences. High taxes on Scottish goods and services, 
such as whiskey and woolens, as well as high rents on 
farmland were perceived as being another unfair act against 
them. As a result, cattle rustling and whiskey smuggling 
were common forms of rebellion which the Scots believed were 
totally within their rights.'® 
Unfair economic policies and situations, along with 
religious, social, and political differences were the water 
for the dormant seeds left over from previous conflicts for 
the Jacobites. Social problems, such as the breakdown of 
the clan system, played a significant role in the Jacobite 
rebellion. The clan chiefs increasingly behaved as lords 
with absolute rights over property and people, rather than 
acting as family leaders with responsibilities and loyalties 
to their people. The Anglicization and intermarriages 
between the English and Scottish aristocracy destroyed the 
relationship between the lairds of the clans and their 
people. 
The political forces behind Culloden and the Highland 
Clearances were the romanticism of the Stuart dynasty, who 
were actually arrogant and capricious political leaders. 
The Stuarts were firm believers in the idea of "the divine 
rights of kings," and were not always willing to treat 
commoners serving in their army with the respect they 
deserved. In fact, the whimsicality of Prince Charles lost 
him a great deal of support from Highlanders, Lowlanders, 
and Catholic Englishmen. 
While the majority of Highlanders supporting the Stuart 
cause were Catholic or Episcopalian, it was not a 
prerequisite for a Jacobite to be a Catholic. The Stuarts, 
however, were fanatical Catholics, and had had a long 
history of persecuting those people who did not share their 
religious beliefs. When in power, the Stuarts had 
consistently refused to allow any freedom of worship or 
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belief to Presbyterian Scots. The principle behind the 
Jacobite cause was to restore the Scots on their own throne 
and their own government. However, religious differences 
and the Stuarts' past history of religious intolerance 
combined to lose support for their cause. 
The first battle occurred in 1715, with the English and 
loyal Scots defeating the Jacobites. What ensued was a time 
of terrible violence, with the English and clans loyal to 
the English crown hunting down the Jacobites led by the 
young Prince Charles Edward Stuart, also known as "Bonnie 
Prince Charlie." The Jacobites were persistent and hopeful, 
but they were finally defeated by the English and Scottish 
armies in 1746 at the Battle of Culloden.^^ 
The "pacification" of the Highlanders and others who 
were loyal to the Jacobite cause began with the intent of 
destroying the ancient life of the glens. The lands and 
titles of Jacobites were confiscated, and they were left in 
poverty. An iron fist and the spying by clans, such as the 
Campbells, controlled the Highlanders.^'' 
The bitterness of being controlled by the English and a 
few clans, as well as having their language and their 
culture repressed were part of the pacification process. 
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After Culloden, the Scots were no longer allowed to wear 
kilts, carry weapons, more specifically the Scottish 
Claymore broadsword, or play the bagpipes. Standard 
English, rather than the Scottish dialect, was to be taught 
in schools, and Gaelic was not to be spoken in schools or 
socially. The Highlanders were viewed as barbarians or 
"wild Irish," and their culture was crude and unacceptable 
to the Lowlanders and the English. The Scottish were no 
longer working in Scottish industries, Scottish social 
conditions, or represented by a Scottish political body. 
These three forces worked to quell rebellious Scots and 
compelled the Scottish masses to conform to superior English 
standards. 
Nineteenth Century Scotland 
By the end of the 18th Century, the Jacobites had been 
defeated, impoverished, and humiliated to the extent where 
they no longer had the heart for rebellion. Economic 
prosperity for the merchant class, and later the middle 
class, brought about by the Union was due to heavy industry. 
The transition from a small farm, agricultural-based economy 
to an industrial-based economy was one which had a 
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devastating impact on the crofters and small farmers. The 
crofters and small farmers were pushed off their lands and 
replaced by sheep or by game stocked in the forests for 
recreational hunting by the aristocracy and the rich.^"' 
The Clearances of the 19th Century forced crofters into 
working in heavy industry, such as mining, steelworks, and 
other mass-producing industries which made the middle and 
upper class rich, but did nothing for the peasants working 
in the factories. Unfortunately, the Clearances, which 
covered the years from 1800-1850, could not have occurred at 
a worse time. The end of the Napoleonic wars brought 
economic upheaval and distress everywhere in Europe. With 
so many men coming back from the wars to a poor economy, 
which offered little opportunity for employment, thousands 
of people were living below poverty levels. The comforting 
and consistent opportunities for employment previously 
existing in the agricultural sector were gone. There was no 
money for soldiers' pensions, and thousands of men were 
going hungry or did not have the means to support their 
families. Consequently, the Highland Clearances, in 
conjunction with the overall economically depressed state of 
Scotland, had devastating results.^® 
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However, not all-modern perspectives of nineteenth-
century Scotland were negative. One perspective offered by 
Lindsay Paterson is that the nineteenth-century was the 
building block for modern Scotland, asserting that the 
dominant theme of nineteenth-century Scottish politics was 
successful nationalism. He maintains that the Scots 
believed they were exercising national autonomy, even when 
they did not have their own parliament. He posits that the 
Scots believed they were capable of exercising their 
autonomy through various local institutions established to 
handle local problems.^® 
The Scots were able to realize and maintain their sense 
of autonomy because of the widening of the franchise in the 
1820's. The franchise was widened to give real power to the 
new middle class of the industrial revolution. It was also 
the significant state involvement in social policy in the 
1840's which worked to transform Scotland into a liberal 
welfare state. The establishment of the Scottish Office in 
1885 was a result of the increased autonomy of Scotland. 
This institution was inaugurated in response to nationalist 
complaints that the growing involvement of the London 
government in social policy threatened to leave Scotland at 
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a disadvantage b'ecause it did not have an administration of 
its own. The Scottish Office's power and influence grew in 
relation to Scotland's wants and needs. Consequently, it 
became the primary agency responsible for maintaining the 
Welfare State in Scotland. Paterson contends that Scottish 
nationalism, in this sense, earned Scotland the position of 
a full partner in an empire rather than a province.^® 
England, however, did not perceive Scotland as an 
equal partner or even worth acknowledging because they did 
not believe the Scots were their social, cultural, or 
economic equal. As a result, the English largely ignored 
how the Scots ran their domestic affairs. How domestic 
affairs were conducted depended upon the leniency of the 
Home Secretary or the Lord Advocate of the Burgh. While 
some Scots were perturbed by the lack of acknowledgement, a 
great many of them took advantage of England's lack of 
attention and focused on establishing free trade, an 
education system superior to that of the English system, 
religious cohesion, and their own unique legal system. The 
Scottish social policy was governed by the system of 
supervisory boards that grew from the 1840's onward. 
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Board members were put in charge of administering all 
the subsequent social legislation that parliament produced 
in the nineteenth century. These supervisory boards 
consisted of local and national committees of lawyers, other 
professionals, and aristocrats. The boards also ran the 
poor law, the rudimentary system of public health, the 
insane asylums, as well as the prisons, and the industrial 
schools for juvenile delinquents. They also registered 
births, marriages and deaths. Eventually, the boards would 
regulate agricultural programs, development of the 
Highlands, the valuation of property, and housing 
regulations.^^ This system lasted until 1885 when the 
office of Secretary for Scotland was created. 
Socially, Scotland's nineteenth century policies 
brought about beneficial changes. Its educational system 
produced some of the greatest thinkers, inventors, 
scientists and engineers of the century.With 
professional success came an increase in philanthropic 
organizations, and Scotland's social programs began to 
benefit more than the upper classes. These organizations 
gave middle-class women a role in social policy that was 
substantial, but without challenging the male dominance in 
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formal social, political, and economic structures. One of 
the organizations that was backed by the crusading zeal of 
women was the National Vigilance Association, which was 
established to protect children from prostitution. Though a 
large number of these groups were founded on religious 
principles of the Church of Scotland, they were not 
adversely affected by the split in the church, acting as a 
key institution for socializing middle-class English 
immigrants into Scottish civil society.^® 
Women's participation in social programs gave them 
power and influence that men did not have. By the latter 
part of the century, some middle-class women also gained the 
right to vote in local elections, such as the municipal 
councils in 1882 and school boards in 1873. A larger 
female-to-male ratio in some parts of Scotland gave women a 
greater influence in local electorates. From 1873 onward, 
women were also allowed to stand for election to school 
boards, and some of them achieved significant educational 
advances for women and the working class. 
The revival of Scottish culture was due to the 
successful economic and educational advances for the upper 
and middle classes, as well as the death of Jacobitism. 
Jacobitism, the practice of those who fought for the Stuarts 
to regain the Scottish throne, was quelled by the 
overwhelming British victory over the Scots at Culloden in 
1745. Broken and poor, the surviving rebels no longer had 
the heart or the resources to continue to fight for the 
Stuarts. 
A new definition of community was established because 
Jacobitism was no longer a threat to the political stability 
of Scotland. A newly unified national culture developed 
around the symbols of the Highlands and Gaelic. The romance 
of the Highlands and the lost cause of the Jacobites 
appealed to both the Lowland Scots and the Highland Scots. 
The new clan societies were very popular, and the sense of 
loyalty and camaraderie associated with the clan system 
played a national role in famine relief in the middle of the 
•3p 
century. 
The Scots of the late nineteenth century romanticized 
the past and believed themselves to be a unique society. 
They praised poets from the past century who wrote in the 
Scottish dialect, such as Robert Burns, and they praised 
novelists who wrote stories about Scottish bravery and 
heroism, such as Sir Walter Scott. Yet, for all the 
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celebration of Scottish culture, the Scots were still trying 
to eradicate any trace of the Scottish brogue from their 
dialect, and voluntarily refrained from teaching Gaelic in 
schools. This need to conform was only one contradiction to 
their celebration of Scottish culture. The other 
contradiction was "unionist nationalism," which will be 
'discussed in the next chapter.^® 
The nineteenth century had its difficulties. In the 
middle part of the century, the Church of Scotland split. 
The Church had played a significant part in creating and 
controlling local civil governments, and their instability 
resulted in an unstable local government. The Scots were 
able to rise above religious and governmental instability. 
By putting general Christian principles rather than ones 
specific to either church or state above everything else, 
the Scots resolved their religious problems.''" 
The religious split was easily resolved in comparison 
to the on-going political struggle. Opinions vary on 
whether the struggle was solely between the Scots and the 
English, or the whether it was between Scottish groups who 
were supported by the English, and those who were not. The 
relationship between Scotland and England has appeared to 
have revolved around one ignoring the other, but the civil 
political strife has been a problem which has consistently 
weakened Scotland/^ 
Having illustrated that they were capable of separating 
Church from State, and emotion from reason, the English 
became lenient towards the Scots. Scots were once again 
allowed to dress in their traditional dress, carry weapons, 
and indulge themselves in other Scottish activities which 
had previously been forbidden. 
Twentieth Century Scotland 
The turn of the century brought more responsibilities 
to the local governments in Scotland. Consequently, the 
status of the Office of the Secretary for Scotland was 
enhanced in 1926 to that of Secretary of State. As the 
Secretary of State's responsibilities grew, St. Andrew's 
House in Edinburgh became the new home of The Scottish 
Office in 1939, and the functions of the Scottish Office in 
London were transferred to Edinburgh. Since this 
transferal, increased power has been given to The Scottish 
Office to handle more effectively Scotland's domestic 
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affairs, such as industrial support, training, higher 
education, and the arts/^ 
However, not all people were satisfied with the power 
given to them by the British Parliament. The incredible 
number of people who lost their jobs in the 1950's when 
heavy industry rapidly declined, the lack of attention the 
problems in Scotland were receiving from the British 
Parliament, and the under-representation of the Scots and 
their interests in the Parliament were grounds for 
discontent. Scotland's discontent with their economic 
situation made them feel powerless to do anything about it. 
A revival of nationalism during the late 1960's and 1970's 
was the result of discontent and helplessness. The 
discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Coast of Scotland 
led many Scots to believe that they could successfully 
separate from England and economically survive." The 
Scottish Nationalists perceived the oil discovery as their 
chance to push for separation. After all, economics had had 
a significant impact on politics in the past, transforming 
Scotland from a free state to a pseudo-partner with England. 
Consequently, the SNP asserted that the oil was Scottish 
oil, and the profits should not be shared with the English. 
Scottish nationalism was the key to creating a political 
force which would lead to Scotland's separation from the 
United Kingdom." 
There are varying degrees of nationalism, and though 
the majority of Scots were frustrated with the current 
political and economic situation, they were not in favor of 
separation. Surveys and polls of the Scottish populace in 
the 1950's and 1970's resulted in a clear majority in 
support of some form of devolved government. 
The Scots voted on a devolution referendum in 1979, but 
it failed. There are several events considered responsible 
for the referendum's failure, but none are as widely 
accepted as the impact party fractionalization had on the 
1979 referendum. Due to the consistent lack of cohesion 
among the parties favoring devolution, the referendum 
failed. Separatists took away votes from the referendum 
because they were unwilling to settle for devolution. 
Others voted against the referendum simply because they 
feared devolution would lead to separation. The Labour 
Party in particular was so seriously divided over the 
referendum that it not only failed to pass it, but it also 
lost the next election.^® 
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The Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, won 
the 1980 election. Thatcher was not sympathetic to the 
Scots and their problems, and for the most part ignored 
their demands. She was, in fact, accused of using Scotland 
as a testing ground for unpopular measures, describing large 
areas of Scottish life as being "sheltered from market 
forces; an exhibit of cultural dependence rather than that 
of enterprise. 
Mrs. Thatcher also earned the disdain of the Scots when 
she informed them that they were privileged to be subsidized 
by the "marvelously tolerant English."^® In addition to 
Thatcher's disdain of the Scots, her Party's efforts to take 
control over the superior Scottish educational system and 
other domestic affairs angered the Scots. Thatcher's words 
and actions made the Scots feel that they were less than 
full partners with the English in the United Kingdom.^® 
The effects of Thatcherism were carried on by the 
Conservative Party even after Thatcher was replaced by John 
Major, Major was regarded with less resentment, but he 
still was not able to change the Scots' opinions of the 
Conservative Party. The Conservative Party's failure to 
resolve problems existing in Scotland, their lack of 
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attention to devolution, and remnants of Thatcherism lost 
them the 1997 election to the Labour Party. 
The Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, has long been 
known as Scotland's party. Blair knew the extent of 
discontent in Scotland, and persuaded the national Labour 
Party to add devolution to its campaign platform. The 
Scottish Labour Party, in conjunction with the Scottish 
Liberal Party, had long been working on a plan for 
devolution, and with the British Labour Party's endorsement 
of devolution. Labour was sure to win, and devolution was 
soon to be a reality. On September 12, 1997, the Scottish 
devolution referendum passed with seventy-five percent of 
Scotland voting in favor of devolution.^'' 
Scotland has had a long history of nationalistic and 
economic strife. Yet, decisions about its internal unity 
and sovereignty were not made based solely on economic and 
nationalistic reasons, but due to political reasons. 
However, these two factors have played a strong and 
influential role in Scotland's history as it will be 
illustrated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS ON THE 
DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM 
Nationalism throughout the world has evolved into in a 
new form known as ethnonationalism. This new form of 
nationalism has been defined as, 
an extension and a continuation of past nationalist 
movements, borrowing from the same vocabulary, and, by 
and large, articulating the demands of distinct ethnic 
groups living within a state to emancipate themselves 
by asserting their identity and attempting to translate 
it into political autonomy or political sovereignty.^ 
Ethnonationalism attempts to translate nationality into some 
form of statehood, and is the powerful political force 
behind the push for devolution in Scotland. 
Modern nationalism is a powerful, unifying political 
ideology. It is a strong and emotional force which has been 
the basis and justification for wars, hatred, and 
intolerance of others since the beginning of the nation-
state. Nationalism unites people through common ancestry, 
ethnicity, consciousness of common traditions and history. 
It also gives people a will to maintain their beliefs, 
religion, language, and territory.^ Providing an identity 
52 
53 
for people gives them a sense of security and belonging. 
Being a part of a group who share beliefs and cultural 
identity provides people with the confidence and strength 
found in acceptance. When no common territory exists, as 
was the case with the Jews, the Greeks, and the Poles, it 
was the memory of common territory they occupied in the past 
that kindles their desire to return. When no political body 
exists to take care of the needs of people, they begin to 
demand their right to have their needs met, just as when one 
nationality holds the power to make decisions for another.^ 
Nationalism has been linked with some terrible events. 
In the 1940's, the Nazis manipulated the identity of the 
German people to justify heinous acts. Nazism included the 
usual nationalist and racist themes but also promised social 
and economic reforms which attacked political and economic 
elites. The Nazis also identified the "domestic" and 
"outside" enemies of Germany as the victorious powers who 
must be defeated. These enemies were notably England, 
France, and the Jews.^ Exterminating millions of Jews, 
gypsies, Russians and Poles for the purpose of protecting 
the "pure" Aryan race from contamination was what the Nazis 
justified through nationalism. 
Another more recent example of nationalism gone awry 
was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. For years, Bosnian Serbs, 
Croatians, and Muslims have fought over land, religion, and 
ethnicity. Violence has been a part of their lives for 
years, making them almost immune to the killing of another 
race just because their religion and ethnicity are 
different. Other violence linked to nationalism in Western 
Europe is embodied in the acts of the Irish Republican Army. 
Their acts have set back peace talks and negotiations 
between Northern Ireland and Ireland for years. The IRA's 
attacks upon the Anglo-Irish Protestant merited the radical 
Protestant group's retaliation against the Irish Catholics. 
The militia wing of the IRA is the most radical side of 
Irish nationalism justifying the use of violence to achieve 
their goal of a united Ireland. Other nationalist groups, 
such as Sein Fenn, do not advocate violence in their work 
towards peace between Northern Ireland and Ireland. 
However, all the peaceful efforts are ignored by the radical 
groups because of their conflicting goals of peace versus 
reunification. Yet, though violence has been associated 
with nationalism, a complete lack of nationalism can be just 
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as detrimental to the state as a radical form of nationalism 
is. ̂ 
Nationalism defines states. A state lacking a sense of 
nationalism has no culturally or socially defining features 
which makes it any different from any other country. 
Unfortunately, because of the past events which have used 
nationalism as a justification for violence, a bad 
connotation has been associated with it. Eastern Europe is 
riddled with examples of violent nationalism. However, not 
all forms of nationalism are violent or threatening. One 
such example is the nationalist movement in Scotland. 
Since the Jacobite Rebellion, there has not been a 
violent, nationalist demonstration in Scotland against the 
English. Fierce football competition between the two 
countries is a mild display of nationalism in comparison to 
the bloodbaths of other examples of nationalism. The Scots 
have also taken great pride in having produced far more 
disciplined and courageous soldiers than the English, but 
this cannot be confused with the violent type of nationalism 
existing in other countries. 
In fact, there are diametrically opposing views of the 
path of Scottish nationalism from the Union of 1707 until 
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the present. One side asserts that Scottish identity died 
and was replaced by a nation's need to mimic the identity of 
the superior English. The other side claims that Scottish 
identity has always remained strong and only needed to be 
reawakened by economic and social decline, as well as by the 
lack of attention they received from the British Parliament. 
However, until Scotland's economic situation had fallen into 
terrible, seemingly unrecoverable decline, very little 
attention was paid by the Scottish masses to Scotland's 
political authority. Thus, the economic conditions in 
Scotland have historically had a direct correlation with the 
level of nationalistic fervor.® 
Sco'b'tish Na'txonalism and Economics 
Historically, Scots have had a long tradition of having 
a strong national identity at different levels. National 
heroes such as Robert the Bruce, William Wallace and Robert 
"Roy" MacGregor have kept alive the pride of the Scottish 
tradition and its heritage. Other nationalities came to 
conquer the Scots but found themselves integrated into a 
unique Celtic culture, and now call themselves Scots. The 
Celts, which have remained the dominant ethnic group in the 
Highlands, have integrated with Scandinavian and French 
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people. This integration has brought cultural enrichment 
and strengthened already existing traditions in Scottish 
culture. Yet, not all Scots have the same ancestral 
background, and the lack of common ancestry has been a 
source of tension between them."' 
Unlike the Highland Scots, the Lowland Scots are mostly 
a mixture of Anglo-Norman blood. While having Norman blood 
may not seem such a glaring defect in the eyes of the modern 
world, at one time having such tainted blood would have 
ostracized an individual from a Highland Clan. Nationalism 
existed not only as an identity for Scotland as a whole, but 
for individual clans as well.® Consequently, feuding among 
the clans, wnetner oecause of coiripetition for leadership 
over the other clans, ownership of land, or due to personal 
insult, was Scotland's largest weakness. More often than 
not, the Scots were defeated by the English because of 
betrayal from their own people rather than by the strength 
of the English. 
Scottish nationalism not only worked for the Scots but 
also against them. For example, William Wallace attempted 
to unite Scotland against the English in the 1300's. 
Wallace had the support of the Scottish masses, but he was 
betrayed by the Scottish lairds who were seduced by Edward I 
of England's promise of lands and wealth if they gave up 
their fight for a free Scotland. The Scottish lairds 
agreed, and Wallace was given to the English to torture and 
kill to set an example for those who sought to unite against 
them. Nationalism suffered in the short run with the loss 
of Wallace, but the guilt of betraying their leader, 
continued economic and social oppression, as well as broken 
promises by the English compelled some Scottish Lords, such 
as Robert the Bruce, to fight for a free Scotland.® 
Nationalism played a key role in defeating the English 
at Bannock Burn in the 1300's. The Scots were fighting to 
improve their way of life, their heritage, and their 
culture. They had once again won the right to rule 
themselves. Once free, Scotland found itself constantly 
struggling to maintain their autonomy from England. As a 
result, Scottish nationalism went into decline, having been 
cast in the shadows compared to belonging to a certain clan, 
improving one's economic situation, or making a decent 
living. Betrayal and pacts with the English overrode 
national pride and loyalty.^® 
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As a result, in 1603, when the Crowns of Scotland and 
England were united, there was very little resistance. 
After all, the man residing on the throne was Scottish, so 
the Scots had nothing to be concerned about. Yet, if the 
Scottish masses had been aware of how very little their 
Scottish king associated himself with Scotland, they would 
have been concerned. King James VI of Scotland, also known 
as King James II of England, cared very little for his 
Scottish heritage. He pandered to the superior English 
culture, whose manners and civilization were so refined that 
they made him ashamed of his Scottish heritage. 
Eventually, these feelings of being economically and 
socially inferior were felt by Scottish elites and 
merchants. They felt the bite of English snobbery and 
economic superiority. These Scottish elites failed to 
recognize their own unique culture or their economic 
potential, such as mass export of their whiskey, salmon 
exports, or their woolen goods. Consequently, in 1707, when 
greedy merchants and opportunistic Scottish lairds sought an 
alliance with England, it was not surprising that their 
national pride was the farthest thing from their minds. 
Their desire for the economic affluence was so great that 
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they were willing to give up their right to rule themselves 
by abolishing their parliament and joining the British 
Parliament. This decision had nothing to do with 
nationalism. After all, only the upper echelon of Scottish 
society were the ones who made the decisions--the masses 
were not given the chance to voice their opinion on the 
topic. The Union of 1707 was an elitist political decision 
based on economic prosperity for the very few rather than 
the majority. 
The Act of Union's Influence on Nationalism and Economics 
The Act of Union was a dark time for Scottish 
nationalism. Yet, there were writers, such as Sir Walter 
Scott who chose to glorify the Scottish people in his 
novels. He focused on their courage, loyalty and strength. 
Scott attempted to preserve Scottishness while still 
supporting the Union between Scotland and England. Though 
he meant well, Scott's work is thought by many current 
nationalists to be a romanticization of Scottish life which 
only added to the quaintness of Scotland. This quaintness 
gave the sophisticated English an edge over the barbaric 
Scots. 
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Later in Scottish history, the Scottish poet Robert 
Burns attempted to revive Scottish nationalism. Burns' 
poetry was written in the Scottish dialect, which had almost 
been completely eradicated from schools, as had Gaelic, the 
original first language of the Scots. There were other 
poets and novelists who wrote realistic works about Scottish 
life and old traditions, and who were basically ignored 
until the twentieth century. They were ignored for 
basically two reasons: Scotland was in denial of its 
identity or because Scots enjoyed reading works by and about 
a culture other than their own.^^ 
Economic prosperity and the large number of social 
programs the union funded were another significant reason 
for the lack of nationalism in Scotland until the twentieth 
century. Industrialization of Scotland, namely steel mills 
and ship building, employed thousands of Scots. Other 
industries, such as modern agriculture and manufacturing 
took root, employing a great number of Scots. Access to 
Indian markets, access to all the colonial markets, as well 
as modern ethnic nationalism and movements of regional 
decentralization were in essence the Scots' attempt to 
humanize the state. 
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In Scotland's case, nationalism is in some respects 
extreme, such as in the desire of the Scottish National 
Party that Scotland be completely separate from England. 
There are also the unionist-nationalists, who are associated 
with the Conservative Party but still consider themselves 
strong advocates of Scotland.^® 
Unionist-nationalists equated unionization with 
nationalism because they felt it was in the best interests 
of Scotland to be a partner in a powerful empire, which 
would offer them many economic and social advantages. These 
advantages included trade access to the colonies, peace with 
England, greater position within Europe, preservation of 
Presbyterianism, preservation of the Scottish legal system, 
and avoidance of the restoration of the Stuarts. 
Unionist-nationalists believed that Scotland would enter the 
union to preserve the best that Scotland had to offer, 
economically, socially, legally, and religiously. 
Conservative nationalists still exist, pushing not for 
devolution, but for more power to be given to the Scottish 
Office to resolve economic problems and to provide funding 
for more social programs. However, in the wake of economic 
and social problems that have not been sufficiently solved 
through union. Conservative numbers have decreased. An 
increasing number of devolutionist-nationalists have 
replaced them. These nationalists are not in favor of 
complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, 
just a devolved parliament that would allow them to solve 
domestic problems more effectively.^® 
Some theorists contend that the quasi-Scottish identity 
of the Conservatives caused the decline in Scottish 
nationalism and pride. While Scots were very aware of their 
history and the past that had separated them from being 
English, they no longer seemed to care about celebrating 
their own unique culture or preserving their sovereignty, as 
long as there was money to be made from giving up these 
qualities. Economic comfort and satisfaction with funding 
of social programs was far more important to the majority of 
Scots rather than any ancestral or traditional ties to any 
defining cultural features.^® 
The other view of Scottish nationalism contends that it 
never really existed in the first place. This school of 
theorists contends that speaking a different dialect, 
descending from different ancestors, celebrating different 
holidays, practicing different religions, and speaking a 
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different language (currently spoken by a minority of the 
population in Scotland) were not significant enough 
differences to justify the Scots demanding their own 
parliament. The Scots want a parliament to have more 
control over their economic programs and to have their own 
position in the European Union. Social program decline, 
rising social needs, and cultural differences are not taken 
into account by this group of theorists.^" 
Consequently, nationalism in Scotland can either be 
defined as an instrument to protect Scottish interests or to 
establish a separate identity from the English.On the 
one hand, some argue that devolution would merely give 
Scotland a local government which would consist of people 
solely concerned with Scottish issues. This side does not 
believe the threat of separation is realistic. On the other 
hand, devolution would cause the decimation of the entire 
United Kingdom. If Scotland devolves, then Cornwall, 
Yorkshire, and other regions who have long complained of 
being ignored would have their own local governments as 
well. The demand to devolve by different regions would 
cause mass chaos, destroying the unitary state which has 
been a part of English culture since William the Conqueror 
landed in England in 1066. With these two very different 
views of nationalism, it can be defined differently to fit 
the national psychology of the Scots at different periods. 
The different views of Scottish nationalism did not unite to 
form one view of nationalism supported by a majority of 
Scottish people until the mid-1960's. This was when 
Scotland's economic situation became so depressing and so 
dismal that the Scots no longer had any faith in their 
united government. Under these conditions, the radical call 
of the Scottish nationalists to fight for their own 
government and eventual separation from the United Kingdom 
inspired a response from the masses. The SNP's demands did 
not seem as foolish or as far-fetched as when Scotland was 
economically and domestically prosperous. The appeal of the 
Scottish National Party made sense and offered a solution to 
a government that was a failure. 
Economics was one of the primary reasons the Act of 
Union passed in 1707. Economics has consistently kept 
Scotland in the Union because of the advantages it offered 
and has continued to offer. However, just as economics was 
used to moderate nationalism in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, it has been used in modern Scotland to 
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awaken nationalism. With nothing to lose economically, and 
everything to gain through profits from the North Sea Oil, 
developed agricultural exports, fishing export, and whiskey 
exports, the Scots were willing to fight for what they now 
perceived as their right as a sovereign nation--the right to 
self-determinism. 
Consequently, as long as the Scottish economy remained 
strong, the middle and upper classes remained prosperous, 
and the Scots were allocated the authority through the 
Scottish Office to resolve successfully their problems, they 
remained content. Economic prosperity was linked to social 
and cultural prosperity, even if it was not their own 
culture and their own society on which they were thriving. 
Economic despair, conversely, brought about the switch 
from nationalist support of the British Parliament to 
nationalist support for, at the very minimum, a devolved 
government, and at the maximum, a separate country. The 
revival of devolutionist-nationalism restored interest in 
Scottish history, Scottish traditions, Scottish music, 
Gaelic, Scottish dialect, and everything else Scots have to 
be proud of in their culture. Twentieth century Scots 
thrived on being uniquely Scottish. They listen to their 
61 
own music, glory in their inventors and scientists, revel in 
the fact they have one of the best educational systems in 
the world, and celebrate their differences in character from 
that of their southern neighbor.^® 
Economics and nationalism played a distinctive and 
important role in making the devolution referendum of 197 9 a 
necessary action for Scottish economic and nationalist 
survival. However, the referendum failed because of fear of 
separation by one group and fear of too little devolved 
power by another. The Scots were unable to reconcile their 
different nationalist views in order to resolve their 
economic difficulties, and in the end, politics was the 
deciding factor. 
Political parties who supported devolution could not 
put aside their differences to realize their common goal: a 
Scottish Parliament. However, in the eighteen years 
following the 1979 referendum Scottish parties, more 
specifically the Scottish Labour Party, worked to design a 
plan which was agreeable to all the parties, and which would 
appeal to the majority of Scots. The nationalist and 
economic conditions of Scotland were finally brought to the 
attention of the most powerful party in Scotland at the time 
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they were willing to act on it. After being out of power 
for eighteen years, the British Labour Party resolved to 
focus on any issues which could insure electoral victory. 
After extensive internal reorganization and reevaluation of 
party priorities, both sections of the Labour Party finally 
concluded that devolution was in the best interests of 
Scotland and of the Labour Party. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF SCOTTISH POLITICAL PARTIES 
Scotland's eventual success in passing the devolution 
referendum was due in part to economics and nationalism. 
However, it was the political mechanism harnessing these two 
elements that made devolution a success. The referendum's 
successful passage was due to the Labour Party's recognition 
of Scotland's economic, domestic, and nationalistic needs. 
The Labour Party openly participated in the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention to draft a devolution plan which 
would satisfy the majority of political needs of the Liberal 
Party, the SNP, as well as their own needs. After seventeen 
years of negotiating and compromising, as well as its own 
internal reorganization and platform changes, the British 
Labour Party was ready to play an active role in 
devolution.^ 
Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the "New Labour 
Party" was eager to endorse devolution officially by adding 
it to its campaign to win the 1997 election.^ Up until the 
1990's, Labour went through the motions of supporting 
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devolution because of its earlier commitment to it. The 
Party also went through the motions of supporting devolution 
to avoid the loss of voter support to the SNP. However, the 
reorganization of the Party attracted members who gave their 
full and sincere support to devolution/ 
Increased support within the Labour Party for 
devolution decreased the fractionalization within the Party, 
eliminating one of the primary factors which caused the 
failure of the 1997 referendum. A strong, united Labour 
Party needed a comprehensive devolution plan to illustrate 
their commitment to giving Scotland the power to deal 
effectively with its domestic affairs. The Labour Party 
drew attention away from the argument that devolution leads 
to separatism by asserting that devolution is necessary for 
the preservation of the United Kingdom. Giving the Scots 
the authority to handle effectively and efficiently their 
domestic affairs, as well as the power of taxation relieves 
the burden from that of the British Parliaments whose 
mediocre efforts have been unable to meet their demands.^ 
Devolution has taken a long time to come to fruition, 
and it is important to understand the economic and 
nationalistic influences which eventually sparked a reaction 
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from the most powerful party in Scotland and England. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine theories for 
centralization and decentralization, the politics involved 
in the Act of Union, and the early and recent devolution 
movement. By examining the events preceding the success of 
the 1997 referendum, the correlation between the success of 
the referendum and the support of the Labour Party will be 
apparent. 
A Political Theory for Centralization and Decentralization 
Political theorists, such as Mark Rouseau and Raphael 
Zarinski postulate that a strong central power is necessary 
to preserve or to improve economic, social and political 
institutions. A strong central government takes control 
from local governments, making political, economic and 
social decisions for it. A central government limits 
citizen participation in the governmental process, setting 
the parameters for all the citizens inhabiting the state. 
All situations and conditions of all areas within a state 
are under the control of the central government. As a 
result, lack of participation and control at the local level 
is usually found acceptable by a state's citizens until 
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their social and economic conditions are no longer 
efficiently and effectively met by the central government.^ 
Rouseau and Zarinski also postulate that once a state 
has reached a level of technological advancement, economic 
achievement, and social cleavages, the state begins to 
demonstrate its lack of power to fulfill effectively the 
needs of its citizens. The citizens within the state begin 
to believe that their needs would be better met by a 
stronger local government. This reaction is fueled by fear 
and resentment of several existing factors. Some of these 
factors are military aggression, higher taxes, bureaucratic 
encroachments, fear of economic stagnation, cultural 
extinction, and enforced uniformity. Rouseau and Zarinski 
concluded that it is necessary to decentralize to meet the 
needs of complex, industrial or postindustrial societies.^ 
Decentralization, whether in the form of federalism or 
devolution, has to some extent acquired the "halo of 
efficiency" once attributed to the central government. 
Certain forms of decentralization allow for more citizen 
control over policy issues that relate to their vital 
interests, enhancing the communication between the local 
government and its citizens. In Scotland's case, devolution 
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was viewed as a necessary adjustment to control its 
postindustrial society.^ 
Advancements and change within the welfare state have 
made its citizens more demanding of the services the state 
promised them. As a part of an advanced welfare state, 
Scotland's citizens demanded more from the Scottish Office. 
Hindered by a lack of political power, as well as the 
funding that goes with it, the Scottish Office struggled to 
meet the needs of the Scots. The failure to meet these 
needs resulted in an increased resentment of the British 
Parliament and a demand for more local authority.® 
The Politics of the Union of 17 07 
Though it has been disputed whether the Scottish masses 
wanted the Union, or if it occurred to satisfy the political 
desires of the Scottish elites, it is an indisputable fact 
that union was not voted on by the masses. It was a 
political decision made by Scottish politicians and 
merchants who stood to prosper from the Union. A union 
between Scotland and England promised economic connections 
for Scottish elites, as well as eventual social programs 
which would be beneficial for the masses. In most respects. 
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the Union was able to fulfill these two requirements for a 
period of time with very little to no political 
interaction.^ 
Politically, the Scottish elites were willing to 
sacrifice representation in a governing body for 
technological advancement, economic prosperity, and national 
unity. While unity resulted in culturally and economically 
disturbing events, such as the highland clearances and the 
banning of the weaving of traditional clan tartans and 
kilts, the union was also beneficial for Scotland.® 
Technological advancements, the development of heavy 
industries, international trade, a strong united military, 
and a dominating, imperial force were the benefits Scots 
realized from the union. These developments were the 
catalysts for a strong union, persuading the Scots to accept 
not only the Union, but also to believe union essential for 
the economic and social prosperity of Scotland. However, 
some of these catalysts also led to a need for devolved 
power from the central governments to the local 
governments.® 
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The Political Catalysts of Devolution 
The devolution movement regained power in the late 
1880's. Economic decline, ineffective social program 
management and a rebirth of Scottish nationalism awakened 
the resentment of English dominance which had lain dormant 
for years. Thus, the Scots began to favor a form of 
government which would address its domestic problems more 
effectively and efficiently. A local government given the 
power to handle taxes, education, and social programs would 
eliminate the red tape represented by a plethora of 
jurisdictionally overlapping agencies working against each 
other to maintain control of local institutions. By 
devolving, Scotland would eliminate the overlap of agencies 
and powers within the Parliament, thus eliminating the 
barriers preventing the resolution of troublesome and 
controversial issues, domestic issues, and local concerns.^® 
Scotland's representation in the British Parliament was 
its only significant role in its national government. 
Scotland's representation consisted solely of the members 
elected to the House of Commons and those fulfilling their 
role in the House of Lords in the British Parliament. In 
the beginning of the Union, England's lack of attention to 
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Scottish affairs did not bother the leaders in local 
politics as long as they were given the authority to handle 
their domestic affairs. As local politics became more 
complex and the economic and social condition of Scotland 
became more demanding, the British Parliament met fewer of 
Scotland's domestic needs . 
Upon uniting in 17 07, Scotland's representation in the 
British Parliament was a one-sided compromise, with Scotland 
winning the right to forty-five seats in the House of 
Commons, and sixteen representative Lords. Originally, the 
Scots had requested fifty seats in the House of Commons, 
while the English had offered thirty-eight. Scotland's 
representation in the House of Commons, in comparison to the 
five hundred and fifty-eight plus members representing 
England in the House of Commons, was disproportional and 
unfair. Their limited representation gave them little 
voice, which no one heard or cared about in the large 
assembly. 
There were limitations other than the lack of 
proportional membership. One such limitation was that the 
House of Commons controlled bills which the Scottish Grand 
Committee reviewed for passage. Another limitation placed 
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on the Scottish representation was that it only required ten 
members of the English representation of the Parliament to 
veto any bills which were to be put before the Scottish 
Grand Committee, and six members of parliament could amend 
any aspect of a Scottish bill which they felt was 
necessary/^ With so many limitations placed on bills which 
involved Scotland, frustration with the Parliament and the 
lack of authority over Scottish affairs mounted. 
Scotland's political situation had become unbearable, 
lacking accountability and effectiveness. It became 
apparent to the masses that a more local and adequate 
structure of government was needed for Scotland, since the 
current arrangement for handling Scottish business, both at 
the executive and the parliamentary level, were now highly 
unsatisfactory. Thus, devolution had become an exigency to 
change the current lack of accountability as well as to 
improve the social and economic situation of Scotland. It 
had become essential in order to resolve economic and social 
problems in Scotland, just as a strong central government 
was at one time perceived necessary for the economic and 
social prosperity of Scotland.^® 
There is little dispute over the idea that the Union 
originally brought political stability and economic progress 
to Scotland, and the idea of political stability eventually 
brought about its acceptance by the Scots. Yet, even though 
the union had been accepted, there remained in Scotland "a 
persistent sense of loss, and a perennial sense of outrage 
at English condensation.This resentment grew when 
foreigners began calling Scotland "North Britain." The 
Scots had been willing to ignore this slur, as long as their 
economic and domestic needs were being met by the Scottish 
Office. However, as Scotland's economic and social 
conditions changed, the previously dormant political parties 
reacted to the declining state of Scotland. 
The Early Devolution Movement 
Upon unification, there were basically two parties 
representing Scotland's interests in the British Parliament. 
The Conservative Party were strong advocates of the United 
Kingdom and Scotland's continuing successful economic, 
social, and political relationship with England. The 
Liberal Party's platform consisted of strong labor rights, 
continued success in industry, and a strong Scottish 
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identity, which was preserved through Scotland's retention 
of its separate legal and administrative system. Retention 
of these systems meant that institutions such as the poor 
law, the education system, and the Church remained intact.^® 
The Scottish Liberal Party favored federalism, believing 
that decentralized power would benefit the United Kingdom, 
but was later persuaded to support devolution.^® 
The Labour Party, which during the twentieth century 
became known as Scotland's Party, was established in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century. Initially, the 
Labour Party did not favor any form of decentralized power 
from the central government. It advocated strong Scottish 
labor, trade and social programs in order to take care of 
Scottish national and international interests. Preserving a 
strong sense of identity through strong social programs was 
the Labour Party's method of maintaining nationalism and 
some semblance of control over Scottish affairs. These 
strong domestic programs and efficient management of 
domestic affairs made devolution and federalism seem an 
illogical position for Labour to take in the political 
realm. 
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Economic decline, a decline in national identity, and 
failure to manage effectively domestic needs with authority 
given to the Scottish Office led to Scotland's first serious 
push for Home Rule in 1886. The first political nationalist 
movement was instigated by the Scottish Home Rule 
Association. It did not focus on the injustice of British 
rule after the fashion of the Parnellites of Northern 
Ireland, but the legislative neglect of Scotland, and the 
need to reform licensing laws, as well as land, game, and 
fishery laws.^^ 
This first movement for Home Rule, which involved 
transferring power from the British Parliament to a Scottish 
Parliam.ent, failed in 1886. Thirteen more proposals for 
Scottish Home Rule were brought before the House of Commons 
between 1890 and 1914. Home Rule was accepted on principle 
by the House of Commons on eight occasions and secured the 
support of a majority of the Scottish Members of Parliament 
on eleven occasions.Yet, even with this support, none of 
the Bills was successful in reaching the Committee stage. 
The lack of initiative behind Scottish bills reflected the 
low priority attached to Scottish Home rule. However, it 
made the Labour Party aware of a powerful movement which 
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placed the economic and national prosperity of Scotland 
above the prosperity of the United Kingdom. 
Economic depression and the rebirth of nationalism 
triggered a reaction within a great many influential Scots 
as well as common Scots. Consequently, Labour's position 
was threatened when former Labour member John MacCormick 
established the Scottish National Party in 1934. The 
Scottish National Party (SNP) did not have a large following 
in the beginning. Economic decline during the 1950's 
increased its membership, and by the mid-1950's, it had won 
five percent of the Scottish vote. Its belief that Scotland 
should be given the right to govern itself was appealing to 
many Scots who believed they were being ignored by the 
British Parliament.^'' 
The authority of the British Parliament may at one time 
have represented increased industrialization, advancements 
in technology, and beneficial social programs; however, as 
present devolution models illustrate, the welfare state 
built through these advancements led to greater expectations 
of the government from the people. Without greater 
authority given to the local governing body, the Scottish 
Office was unable to meet the needs of the people. The 
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number of people who were disgruntled with the lack of local 
government by the British Parliament increased and the 
ideology of the SNP began to appear rational rather than 
ridiculous. 
The SNP gradually grew in numbers and became more 
organized and better funded as a result of the inadequacies 
of the British Parliament. Still, even with the increasing 
number of Scots turning to the SNP in the 1960's, the Labour 
Party did not percieve them as a serious threat to their 
position in Scottish politics until the 1970's. The 
culmination of incredible unemployment in old industries, a 
rebirth of Scottish identity, and the hope that the 
discovery of oil in the North Sea that would rebuild the 
Scottish economy inspired the SNP. Encouraged by the 
enthusiasm and hope of their supporters, the SNP was 
compelled to push for, at the very minimum, a Scottish 
Parliament, and, at the most, complete separation from the 
United Kingdom. Having their own parliament appealed to the 
majority of Scots, but the idea of separation was a threat 
to many. 
The focal point of the SNP's campaign for separation 
from the United Kingdom was the North Sea oil. According to 
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these nationalists, the oil was Scotland's oil, and the 
profits accrued from it should be used to support 
Scotland.With oil as a viable economic source, Scotland 
could be independent from the United Kingdom. The SNP 
promised that with separation, Scotland would be far better 
off than if it were united with England. They would have 
complete control over their own taxes on goods and services, 
control over their money, their own parliament to make 
effective decisions regarding domestic problems, and their 
own national identity in the world affairs, more 
specifically, the European Union. 
The increased support the SNP was getting for its plan 
to separate from the Union and its increased credibility as 
a party were due to the poor economic conditions which were 
to be resolved by the North Sea oil. This increase in 
support alarmed the Labour Party. To counteract the success 
of the SNP, as well as to appease the voting Scots, the 
Labour Party was the last party, other than the Conservative 
Party, to add devolution to its platform in the mid-
1970 ' s 
The three most powerful parties in Scotland in the 
1970's advocated some form of devolved power. The Scottish 
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Liberals' platform was similar to that of the Labour 
Party's. It differed in that the Liberals preferred 
federalism over devolution because they felt devolution was 
too limited.^" The SNP favored complete separation of 
Scotland from the United Kingdom, but the less radical 
members were willing to work towards the more realistic goal 
of attaining their own parliament. The Labour Party 
attempted to assuage any fears of separation occurring by 
strongly stating that its devolution plan did not support 
devolution and that it was only in favor of devolving power 
to a Scottish Parliament. 
The parties all agreed there needed to be some form of 
devolved power which would give Scotland the means necessary 
to resolve its domestic affairs. Differences in the types 
and degree of power which would be given to Scotland, as 
well as the threat of devolution leading to complete 
separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, were 
barriers which proved to be detrimental to the devolution 
referendum at the time the vote failed in 1979.^^ 
Disagreements with the devolution plan put before the 
Scottish people for passage in 1979 were significant enough 
to defeat the referendum. Severe fractions within the 
Labour Party, who was responsible for drafting and 
introducing the bill voted upon, were the cause for several 
restrictions to be placed on the bill which had adverse 
effects on its passage. One such restriction was the need 
for forty percent of the voting population to vote in favor 
of devolution for the referendum to become law. By placing 
this restriction on the bill, all abstainers and all people 
voting no, either because they were actually opposed to 
devolution or because they wanted more powers given to the 
Scottish Parliament, were setting the referendum up for 
failure. Also, there was some controversy over whose votes 
actually should be counted and those who should not have 
been counted. There is still a question of whether the 
referendum was lost by a two percent margin or an eight 
percent margin. 
The lack of cohesion on the part of the Labour Party, 
as well as a lack of consensus on the devolution plan among 
the parties who favored it all contributed to the 
referendum's failure. This failure did not abolish 
devolution from any of these parties' platforms. Instead, 
the referendum's controversial failure insured that 
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devolution would be an issue for future discussion, 
planning, and development.^^ 
The New Devolution Movement 
Labour lost power after the failure of the devolution 
referendum and was replaced by the Conservative Thatcher 
government. Undeterred by the failure, committed 
devolutionists formed the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly 
(CSA) in March 1980.^^ The sole goal of this organization 
of individuals and affiliated bodies was the creation of a 
directly elected legislative assembly for Scotland. 
Administrative devolution had been occurring for years, but 
had proved to be ineffective without the support of a 
legislative assembly.^® The CSA attracted support from 
across the political spectrum, and in 1981, the CSA 
published a "Blueprint for Scotland. 
This plan emphasized the need to achieve a broad 
consensus behind an Assembly scheme, as well as making 
reference to the United Nations Charter in proclaiming the 
right of Scotland to have their own parliament. The CSA 
also determined Scotland had the rights of a nation, and 
therefore should be able to determine its own political 
future. The CSA continued its policy of passive, uninspired 
lobbying. It continued to draw praise for its persistent 
efforts, but in reality they achieved very little.^® 
Frustrated with its lack of success, the CSA called for 
the establishment of a Constitutional Convention. 
Established in 1985, the Constitutional Convention would be 
composed of elected or delegated members to draw up an 
Assembly scheme, turn it into a Bill, and present it to 
Parliament as the democratically expressed wishes of the 
Scottish people.^' 
This ambitious proposal was met with a mixed reaction 
from the parties, with Labour's being the most pronounced. 
The Labour Party had always maintained a careful distance 
from the CSA. Their official position in the summer of 1986 
regarding the CSA was that a Constitutional Convention was 
unnecessary because Labour was going to win the next 
election. Electoral victory would firmly commit to 
establishing a Scottish Assembly.^" 
However, Labour lost the 1987 election, and the CSA 
established a Constitutional Steering Committee chaired by 
Professor Sir Robert Grieve. Professor Grieve, a 
distinguished former chairman of the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board, and Jim Ross, the secretary of the 
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committee, co-authored the report for the committee. 
Published in 1988, "A Claim of Right for Scotland" referred 
to the two previous Claims of Right which the Scots issued 
against mis-government in 1689 and 1842. The report also 
established a third Claim of Right: Scotland had the right 
to declare directly its demands and grievances rather than 
have them articulated for them by a government utterly 
unrepresentative of Scots. The Claim's goals were to draw 
up a scheme for a Scottish assembly, mobilizing Scottish 
opinion behind the scheme, and persuading the government to 
approve the scheme or an acceptable modification of it.^^ 
This uncompromising position on Scotland's status as a 
nation was not protected by the "British" Constitution, and 
the Scots were compelled to take matters into their own 
hands. Once again, a Constitutional Convention was 
suggested, and this time it was established with the support 
of the SNP, the Scottish Trade Union Congress, the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, and all the 
Scottish Churches.More importantly, the Labour Party was 
compelled to swallow its doubts and participate in the 
Constitutional Convention to prevent its exploitation by the 
SNP." 
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Labour, due to its larger membership, quickly became 
the stronger of the two parties. Feuds between the SNP 
leadership and the Labour leadership finally resulted in the 
withdrawal of the leadership of the SNP. Many members of 
the SNP remained in the Convention and in support of 
devolution, but the official position of the SNP was that it 
no longer supported devolution. 
Having launched a successful "Independence in Europe 
Campaign," which overturned a large Labour majority to win 
the seat, the SNP believed their supporters would leave the 
Convention and follow them in their fight for separation. 
However, this was too radical a move for those in favor of 
devolution, and the SNP lost support to the Convention. 
Yet, it was not a complete loss. The SNP had managed to 
open the eyes of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, 
convincing them that there was definitely a need for 
Scotland to have its own elected assembly with its own 
powers. 
During the years between its establishment in 1988 and 
the 1992 general election, the Convention held a series of 
meetings to discuss the details of a plan for a devolved 
government. Deadlines for publication of a plan for 
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devolution were pushed back, which eventually began to raise 
the suspicions of many: had the Convention become a 
stalling device rather than a force for devolution?^® While 
it is true that the Convention kept launching and 
relaunching what seemed to be the same proposals, they were 
in fact dealing with some difficult issues which took a 
great deal of effort and compromise to resolve. Tax-power 
issues, proportional representation, and gender 
representation were issues which took some time to resolve 
in the devolution plan.^^ 
In addition to difficult issues. Labour lost ,focus and 
stepped back from political devolution, contending that 
there were more pressing issues on which to focus. It was 
apparent that the Convention had lost momentum, and it was 
necessary for the Convention delegates to regroup and regain 
their focus. The need for resolution of these issues 
escalated when the "New Labour Party," which had undergone 
internal policy and organizational change, recognized the 
support for devolution in Scotland and Wales. Seeking to 
win the 1997 election. Labour's leader, Tony Blair, 
persuaded his party to support the efforts of the 
Convention. 
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Convinced that devolution would be key in the 1997 
campaign, Labour worked hard to organize the other delegates 
of the Convention. They pushed the other delegates from 
other parties and organizations, such as teachers' groups 
and civil servants' groups, to make decisions on issues 
which had hindered agreement for a devolution referendum in 
the past.®° 
However, even though Labour managed to rejuvenate the 
Convention, it faced other difficulties. The Conservative 
Party, though weakened, was adamantly opposed to devolution. 
John Major denounced devolution as the worst possible threat 
in modern history, claiming it would lead to the 
disintegration of the United Kingdom, or at the very 
minimum, breeding an atmosphere of discontent. Discontent 
would lead to English regions clamoring for their own 
regional assemblies, and this would lead to utter chaos. 
With these considerations in mind, the Convention had 
to draft a devolution plan which would clearly outline the 
powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, as 
well as firmly stating that devolution would not lead to 
separatism. Devolution by definition will not lead to 
separatism, but another great concern was the Scottish 
94 
Parliament having the power to raise taxes. After much 
debate within the Convention, it was determined that the 
devolution referendum would ask two questions. The first 
question was whether Scotland should have its own 
parliament, and the other was whether it should have the 
right to raise taxes. 
With these two considerations in mind, the Convention 
released The White Papers in July 1997. This document 
outlined the role of the Scottish Parliament, and all the 
matters over which it would have legislative power. The 
Scottish Parliament would have general responsibility for 
the National Health Service in Scotland as well as 
responsibility for public and mental health. It would also 
be responsible for the education and training of health 
professionals and the terms and conditions of service of NHS 
staff and general practitioners. Also, school education, 
including pre-five year-olds, primary and secondary 
education, the functions of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Schools and teacher supply, as well as the training and 
conditions of service were to fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament would also 
be in control of higher education, including policy. 
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funding, the functions of the Scottish Higher Education 
Funding Council, and student grants. Other facets of 
education with which the Scottish Parliament would be 
involved were science and research funding, training policy 
and lifelong learning, vocational qualifications, and 
careers advice guidance. 
The Scottish Parliament would also be responsible for 
local government, including local government finance and 
local domestic and non-domestic taxation, social programs, 
housing, and land-use planning and building control. It 
would also be responsible for economic development, 
financial assistance to industry, internal investment, trade 
and exports, tourism, and air and sea transport. 
Laws and home affairs, such as criminal, civil, and 
electorate laws, judicial appointments, courts, tribunals, 
legal aid, parole, prisons, liquor licensing, and other 
domestic affairs would fall under the responsibilities of 
the new parliament. Other responsibilities included 
environmental concerns, agricultural, forestry and fishing 
regulations, sport and the arts, as well as registration and 
records. 
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All the responsibilities the Scottish Parliament would 
assume were recorded in the White Papers, which were then 
approved by the British Parliament and deemed ready for the 
people's vote. On September 12, 1997, seventy-four point 
two percent supported the bid for a Scottish Parliament, and 
sixty-three point four percent supported limited tax-raising 
powers for the Scottish Parliament. Labour had managed to 
pass the devolution referendum, and Scotland's Parliament 
was scheduled to be functioning by January 1999.^^ The 
Scots had finally been given the right to govern themselves 
after relinquishing this right 290 years earlier. 
There are still more decisions and preparations to be 
made. For example, who will become the first prime minister 
of the Scottish parliament? Where in Edinburgh will the 
Scottish Parliament hold their sessions? How will 
representatives from each district be elected? Scotland 
will have its own people from its own parties making these 
decisions for it. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
A Scottish Parliament has finally become a reality 
through the efforts of the Labour Party. Without Labour's 
agreement to support fully devolution, it is unlikely 
Scotland would be preparing for its Parliament in 1999. 
Devolution was a political movement manipulated by the 
British Labour Party to win the 1997 election. Economics 
and nationalism played an important part in devolution's 
success, but it would be a naive assumption to cite them as 
the primary reasons for the devolution referendum's success 
in 1997. The British Labour Party was very aware that they 
needed to recapture the support and credibility the Scottish 
National Party had managed to accrue over the past three 
decades in order to win Scotland's support in the 1997 
election. 
Along with acknowledging the SNP as their main 
opponent, the British Labour Party also realized that 
Scotland's domestic affairs were not being given the 
attention needed to resolve successfully these issues. The 
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Party also recognized that the economic situation in 
conjunction with the rebirth in nationalism needed to 
addressed. The Party ignored explosive catalysts, such as 
economic decline and a rise in nationalism, which had only 
added to the support of the Scottish Nationalists. The 
Party was forced the consider the increased support of the 
SNP as a threat to their power in Scotland. 
Finally, the Labour Party had been completely 
reorganized by Tony Blair. All of these factors changed the 
feelings of the Labour Party from merely a token show of 
support for Scottish devolution to all-out support of a 
movement which would prove necessary for providing the Scots 
the means to resolve domestic problems, as well as to 
preserve the United Kingdom from the disintegrating 
influences of the Scottish National Party. These factors 
have been the primary forces for the devolution movement 
within Scotland. However, history, economic and social 
decline, as well as devolution theory, have also played an 
important role in Scotland's battle for its own parliament. 
Historically, Scotland has been a country which has had 
a long history of fighting for independence from the 
English, as well as a history of turbulent relationships 
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among their clans. Fighting for freedom from the English 
was a uniting factor for years, but many times has proved 
insufficient as a unifying force. The reasons for remaining 
unified against England became less and less compelling. 
Economic prosperity for the political elites, along with the 
promise of social improvement became more important than 
unity, and the Scots became less concerned with maintaining 
their national identity. 
The inferiority complex of the Scottish elites was a 
commanding force behind the need for the anglicization of 
the Scots. These elites perceived the English to be 
superior to them in culture, society, and economics. As a 
result, Scots buried their previously strong feelings of 
nationalism and capitulated under the force of 
anglicization. Even though they retained their legal 
system, their court system, and their education system, 
other aspects of Scottish culture changed. The 
manufacturing of traditional dress was outlawed, Scottish 
literary figures were dismissed as inadequate rather than 
celebrated, and the native language of the Scots, Gaelic, 
was no longer taught in school. These all combined to 
change the Scots. 
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Economically, the Scots no longer were an agricultural-
based society. With the Highland Clearances in the 1800's, 
small acreage farmers were forced to work in the cities. 
They were employed in steel mills, on fishing boats, in 
woolen mills, in mass manufacturing, and other industries. 
These industries brought prosperity for the Scots, but also 
were a disappointment when they led to environmental damage 
and economic depression when they were no longer in demand. 
The early twentieth century saw the first severe decline in 
heavy industry in Scotland. Steel mills closed down, and 
mass manufacturing of goods suffered. The advent of World 
Wars I and II rejuvenated these industries because of the 
need for steel products, but at the end of the second world 
war, their industries went into severe decline once more. 
It was estimated in the 1950's that thousands of jobs were 
lost when mills closed. With unemployment high, and the 
Scottish Office lacking the power to aid Scotland's economic 
decline, people were upset with the lack of accountability 
and attention of the British Parliament to their situation. 
This feeling of helplessness gave the Scottish National 
Party the support they needed to begin winning seats in 
Parliament. The SNP's increased popularity, along with the 
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discovery of oil in the North Sea, caused the Labour Party 
to take a position on devolution instead of merely opposing 
it or ignoring it. Consequently, when the push for 
devolution was at its strongest, the Labour Party half­
heartedly threw its lot in with the devolutionists. The oil 
crisis and party fractionalization proved too difficult for 
advocates of devolution to overcome. As a result, the 1979 
devolution referendum was lost due to the fractionalization 
of the Labour party and the economic instability caused by 
the oil crisis. 
Though frustrated, devolutionists worked hard to keep 
home rule on the political agenda. Unfortunately, 
devolution was placed on Labour's less urgent issues list. 
Yet, devolutionists were not defeated, and formed the 
Constitutional Convention in the early 1980's to formulate a 
better devolution plan. The experience of Thatcherism 
compelled many Scots to support devolution. Treated as 
guinea pigs for Thatcher's new schemes and having their 
needs ignored by Thatcher's government, the Scots began to 
believe that devolution was the only way in which to gain 
the power to resolve their domestic problems. 
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A revised devolution plan and a reorganized Labour 
Party to handle more effectively the problems of Scotland in 
the 1990's led to the official endorsement of Scottish 
devolution by the British Labour Party. With the full 
support of the largest party in Scotland, the Constitutional 
Convention was able to resolve the conflicts delaying the 
presentation of another plan to the British Parliament. The 
Parliament agreed to allow the devolution plan to be put 
before the people for a vote on September 12, 1997, where it 
was passed by a large majority. It was obvious that the 
people of Scotland were willing to take on a huge political 
responsibility by once again having their own parliament. 
Scottish devolution is a case among many cases existing 
in Western and Eastern Europe and Asia. It differs in that 
it was not a reaction to violence existing between ethnic 
groups, but because it was a peaceful recognition of 
national and economic problems which could better be 
resolved by a stronger local government. 
In general, the main fear attached to devolution is 
that it would eventually lead to separation rather than a 
stronger union between the United Kingdom and Scotland. 
Devolutionists counter this fear by positing that devolution 
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by definition is the transferal of authority from a central 
power to a local government to preserve and strengthen 
unions rather than destroy them. In Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Russia, and other countries who are in the process of 
( 
devolving, devolution was necessary to preserve their 
national governments and to preserve peace. Economic and 
nationalistic needs of these countries made it necessary for 
them to have the authority to handle them. Outbreaks of 
violence and protests in these countries increased the 
tension between ethnic groups in the nation-state. Meeting 
the sovereign demands of self-determination of the nation-
state is necessary, and devolution is the means to realize 
this. 
Devolution is a healthy solution to political and 
social growth, economic and political change, economic 
stagnation, or economic and social decline. Transferring 
authority from the central power to the local power is 
necessary to resolve the domestic problems of Scotland and 
to preserve and strengthen the union. With devolution being 
an acceptable means of resolving conflicts within a nation, 
the Labour Party's support of devolution was perceived as 
rational and necessary. Though it is difficult to determine 
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if the Scottish Parliament will be more successful in 
handling Scottish affairs than the British Parliament, it is 
evident that devolution has proven to be an effective way of 
resolving conflicts within the nation-state. 
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